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ESCAPE FROM NEW YORK: ANALYZING THE STATE'S
RELATIVE INTERESTS IN PROSCRIBING THE WITHDRAWAL
OF LIFE SUPPORT AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE*
This Note argues that states cannot consistently prohibitphysician assisted
suicidefor terminally illpatientswhile they continue to allow the withdrawalof life
supportfor even non-terminalpatients. All of the state interests identified by the
Supreme Court in rejecting a right to assisted suicide are implicated to a higher
degree by withdrawalof life support. The primary reasonfor this difference is that
withdrawal of life support often involves incompetent patients and surrogate
decision making while assisted suicide by definition requires a competent patient
choosing to hasten her death.

INTRODUCTION

"In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or
attempt suicide, but patients may refuse even lifesaving medical treatment."' In
Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court held that New York's legalization of the latter
practice while it continues to prohibit physician-assisted suicide (PAS) does not
"violate[] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 2
The validity of this decision is becoming increasingly important in the face of
legal challenges by the federal government to Oregon's Death with Dignity Act,3
which legalized physician-assisted suicide." Recently, Attorney General John
Ashcroft appealed the District Court's rejection of his attempt to nullify Oregon's
law to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and "Congress has twice considered
preempting the Oregon law."5
I would like to thank Professor Donald Tortorice for his valuable assistance inhelping
me to write and refine this Note.
*

Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997). Under Oregon law, physician-assisted
suicide involves a physician prescribing a lethal dose of drugs to a competent, terminally ill
patient who will self-administer the drugs. Withdrawal of life support involves a physician
or his assistant removing life-sustaining treatment from a patient who is sometimes
incompetent or not suffering from a terminal illness.
2 Id. 'at 797.
OR. REV. STAT.

§§ 127.800-127.897 (2001).

Oregon is presently the only state where PAS is legal.
Lindsay F. Wiley, Ashcroft Appeals Assisted Suicide Decision, PAIN & L., May 24,
2002, athttp://www.painandthelaw.org/palliative/ashcroft_053002.php. Congress tried "once
in 1998 with the Lethal Drug Abuse and Prevention Act and again in 1999 with the Pain
Relief Promotion Act of 1999. The second bill passed the House but failed to reach a vote
in the Senate." Id.
'
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If any of these attempts to nullify state law are successful, no states will be
allowed to legalize PAS, even by popular vote. In light of this possibility, it
becomes essential to reconsider the validity of the Supreme Court's decision on
different grounds.
In order to reach its decision in Vacco, the Supreme Court had to go through two
levels of analysis.6 First, it had to determine whether New York had committed a
facial violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Under the Clause, "[s]tates must
treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly." 7 The Court held that
New York was merely adhering to the latter principle "[b]y permitting everyone to
refuse unwanted medical treatment while prohibiting anyone from assisting a
suicide."'
According to the Court, "[t]he distinction comports with fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent."9 Even if this distinction is legally tenable, the
State must still "satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification
1
bear a rational relation to some legitimate end."'
To avoid violating the Equal Protection Clause, then, the State must have
rational reasons for its inconsistent treatment of withdrawal of life support and PAS
based on their disparate effects on identified state interests. Each section of this
Note will challenge a purported state interest in distinguishing between PAS and the
withdrawal of life support."
Section One will analyze the State's "interests in protecting the integrity and
ethics of the medical profession."' 2 First, it will argue that the public perceives no
meaningful distinction between a physician terminating life support and prescribing
a lethal dose of drugs to a terminally ill patient. Further, patients are primarily
concerned with life being extended artificially by advanced technology and with
physicians being unresponsive to their requests because of the implicit rationing of
6

Vacco, 521 U.S. at798.

Id. at 799.
8 d.at 808.
9 Id.
at 801. While this contention ishighly suspect, this Note will assume the distinction
isvalid and only question the second prong of the Court's analysis. But cf.infra Section II.C.
10

Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809.

On the same day the Court decided Vacco, italso decided Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997). That case involved a due process challenge to the denial of a right to
PAS for terminally ill patients. InGlucksberg, the Court went into great detail describing the
state's interest in prohibiting PAS, while in Vacco, the Court merely listed the state's
interests and referred to its analysis in Glucksberg. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809 (stating that
these interests "are discussed in greater detail in ...Glucksberg"). Therefore, the Court's
analysis of these interests will be cited to Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702. Note, however, that,
because the Court in Vacco merely referred to its analysis in Glucksberg, it never analyzed
why the state has a greater interest in banning PAS than it does in banning the withdrawal
of life support.
2 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at731.
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"managed care." Finally, the withdrawal of life support actually involves a much
more active role for the physician in causing her patient's death than does PAS.
Section Two will consider the State's "unqualified interest in the preservation
of human life."1 3 Initially, it will determine that the State's interest is more about
limiting what one human can do to another than about preserving the "sanctity" of
life. To the extent that "sanctity" is important, however, the withdrawal of life
support is allowed even for non-terminal individuals while only terminally ill
patients may request PAS in Oregon. Finally, because physicians primarily
withdraw life support from unconscious patients, a surrogate must often make the
choice between life and death. Because surrogate decision making is inaccurate, and
because it sometimes leads to a court determining whether the patient's quality of
life is low enough to justify death, the withdrawal of life support substantially
implicates the "sanctity" of life. Conversely, PAS always involves a lucid patient
making the ultimate decision on her own.
Section Three will analyze the State's "interest in protecting vulnerable
groups - including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons - from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes."' 4 It will begin by noting that initial reports on Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act have revealed no evidence of any exploitation of any of the
above groups. It will then argue that, because patients on life support are often
unconscious and require greater resources than other terminal patients, they are more
likely to be subject to exploitation.
Finally, Section Four will look at the State's "fear that permitting assisted
suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia."' 5 First, the argument for a legal slippery slope is untenable in light of
the Court's own line-drawing in Vacco. Second, the Court's analogy to the Dutch
system of "de-criminalized" euthanasia and PAS is inapplicable to a legalized,
regulated scheme of PAS, such as that found in Oregon. Finally, to the extent the
Netherlands does serve as a harbinger of a slippery slope, it should serve to caution
against legalization of withdrawal of life support, not legalization of PAS.
Admittedly, the State has a low burden to meet in proving that its
disproportionate treatment of withdrawal of life support and PAS bears some
rational relationship to a legitimate end. On the other hand, the Court in Vacco
provided no analysis as to why the state interests it analyzed in Glucksberg applied
to any greater extent to PAS than to withdrawal of life support. When properly
analyzed, it becomes clear that each identified state interest is implicated to a greater
degree by withdrawal of life support than by PAS. Consequently, the State has no
rational basis for its disproportionate treatment of the two acts, and states banning
PAS are violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,282 (1990)).
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
" Id. at 732.
14

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:779

I. PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
A. Introduction
According to the Court, "[t]he State... has an interest in protecting the integrity
and ethics of the medical profession."' 6 First, "the American Medical Association,
like many other medical and physicians' groups has concluded that '[p]hysicianassisted physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the
physician's role as healer.""' 7 Further, "physician-assisted suicide could, it is
argued, undermine the trust that is essential to the doctor-patient relationship by
blurring the time-honored line between healing and harming."' 8 More perniciously,
"[tihe patients' trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests will
be hard to sustain" if PAS is legalized.' 9
There are serious flaws with the Court's arguments no matter how they are
construed. To begin, the Supreme Court's reliance on the American Medical
Association's Code of Ethics is misguided. The AMA's "policy regarding PAS was
not made binding upon its members."2 ° Second, despite the AMA's "advisory"
view, there is growing "evidence that a significant number of physicians support the
practice of hastening death in particular situations."2 '
Second, "the notion that physicians are solely engaged in healing and

16

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.

17 Id.(quoting

AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 2.211 (1994)) (alteration
in original).
'8 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
19 Id.(quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 355-56 (1996) (testimony of Dr. Leon R. Kass)).
20 W. Noel Keyes, The Choice of Participation by Physiciansin CapitalPunishment,22
WHITTIER L. REV. 809, 814 (2001). This is in contrast to the AMA's policy prohibiting
physician participation in executions, a policy that was made binding upon its members. See
id.
at 809 & n.2. Incontrast, the American Medical Women's Association (AMWA) supports
physician participation in PAS. See Position Paper, Am. Med. Women's Ass'n, Position
Statement on Physician Assisted Suicide (Nov. 1997) ("AMWA supports the right of
physicians to engage in practice wherein they may provide a patient with, but not administer,
a lethal dose of medication and/or medical knowledge, so that the patient can, without further
assistance, end his/her life."), available at http://www.amwa-doc.org/publications/
Position_Papers/suicide.htm.
2 Glucksberg,521 U.S. at 749 n. 12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). One "survey published in
the New England Journal of Medicine found that 56% of responding doctors in Michigan
preferred legalizing assisted suicide to an explicit ban." Id.; see also UNIV. OF WASH. SCH.
OF MED., ETHICS IN MEDICINE: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE ("Surveys of individual
physicians show that half believe that PAS is ethically justifiable in certain cases."),
availableat http://eduserv.hscer.washington.edu/bioethics/topics/pas.html (last modified Oct.
2001).
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prolonging life has come into severe dispute."22 "The public no longer (if it ever
did) desires to attempt to preserve life in all instances, nor do they wish to bear the
costs [that] may be required in order to do so. '23 The majority of Americans accepts
that physician participation in acts such as abortions and executions is "of benefit
to both individuals and society.",2' Thus, the public generally does not believe the
only proper role of physicians is as healers, always extending life.
This Section will argue that the public perceives no important distinction
between PAS and the withdrawal of life support. Further, patients should be more
concerned with legalized withdrawal of life support and the policy of double effect
than with PAS. In addition, patients are more concerned with physicians using
modern technology to extend suffering and with physician abandonment than with
the idea of PAS. Finally, if the ban on PAS is based on causation, the State should
be more concerned with the physician's role in causing death when he withdraws
life support than when he assists in a suicide.
B. Public Perception
If the argument is that the integrity of the medical profession will be diminished
in the public eye as a result of PAS, it is tenuous at best. Some have opined that,
"from the perspective of the lay public, a doctor's pulling of the plug and
precipitating death may seem as much a killing as provision of a prescription for
Keyes, supranote 20, at 814. "When medical science became capable of prolonging
the dying process beyond the point that most patients would wish, medical management of
the dying process became anecessity. Health-care providers no longeri [can] strive inexorably
to extend waning human lives." Norman L. Cantor, Philosophyand Law: The Real Ethic of
Death and Dying, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1718, 1718 (1996).
23 Keyes, supranote 20, at 814 (quoting 2 W. NOEL KEYES, LIFE, DEATH, AND THE LAW:
22

A SOURCEBOOK ON AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN MEDICAL ETHICS 808 (1995)).
24 Keyes, supra note 20, at 814. Inthe capital punishment context, the public recognizes

physician participation allows executions to be performed in the most efficacious manner.
In fact, many states require that a physician at least be present during the execution while
other states require physicians to "insert[] intravenous lines for lethal injections" and
"administer[] ...injection drugs or their doses or types." Stacey A. Ragon, A Doctor's
Dilemma: Resolving the Conflict Between Physician Participationin Executions and the
AMA 's Code of Medical Ethics, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 975, 977, 987 (1995).
Also, note that if the Court is really concerned about placing limits on human
relationships, it contradicts itself to the extent it allows capital punishment. To the extent it
allows physicians to participate directly in the execution of a prisoner but not even indirectly
to assist in the suicide of a patient, the inconsistency becomes even more glaring. Even if the
Court can maintain that withdrawal of life support is not akin to killing a patient, the same
argument cannot be made for executions. If this practice is allowed, if physicians can
prescribe lethal doses or morphine to patients, and if physicians can abort fetuses, one
wonders how the Court can maintain that physician's only role is as healers?
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poison.""
Whether there is a legal distinction between the two acts is irrelevant toward
safeguarding the public perception of physicians as long as the public conflates the
two acts. If the public sees no ethical distinction, "the symbolic message embodied
in the distinction between killing and letting die becomes confused and hollow. 26
Perhaps most importantly, studies have shown that the vast majority of patients
would not lose trust in their physician if she participated in PAS. In one "survey of
adult patients, researchers found that 90.5% of patients would consider a physician
who assisted suicides to be.as trustworthy as other physicians in providing care to
critically ill patients."27
In fact, patients may be less trustworthy of physicians who do not participate in
PAS. "[F]or some patients, it would be a physician's refusal to dispense medication
to ease their suffering and make their death tolerable and dignified that would be
inconsistent with the healing role."'" This is because "[p]atients fear that when they
are suffering intolerably, they will be denied the drugs that are necessary to end their
suffering."29 Presently, the American public is more concerned that modem medical
technology will artificially extend lives than with the prospect of legalized PAS.
Primarily, "[t]he public seems to fear the dying process now because it believes
doctors' efforts will prolong, not relieve suffering."3
It has even been argued that "it is clear... trust cannot survive in the present
context surrounding dying."'" Some doubt that "the public [can] place much faith
in a process that involves ... 'long, drawn out months to years of increasingly
complicated illness that can require an array of specialists, confusing choices, false

25

Norman L. Cantor & George C. Thomas III. The Legal Bounds of PhysicianConduct

Hastening Death, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 155 (2000); see also Stephen A. Newman,
Euthanasia:Orchestrating "The Last Syllable of. .'. Time," 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 153, 166
(1991) ("[lI]n the modem medical setting, these terms and distinctions are ephemeral. The
concept of natural death in the hospital has lost its meaning.").
26 Cantor & Thomas, supra note 25, at 155.
27 David Orentlicher, The Legalization of PhysicianAssisted Suicide: A Very Modest
Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443 n.43 (1997) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Legalization](citing
Mark A. Graber et al., Patients' Views About PhysicianAssistedSuicide and Euthanasia,1
J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 71, 73 (1996)) (studying 228 patients at a single university-based
family practice program); see also UNIV. OF WASH. SCH. OF MED., supra note 21 ("Surveys
of patients and members of the general public find that the vast majority think that PAS is
ethically justifiable in certain cases . ... ").
"' Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also S.D. Block & J.A.
Billings, Patient Request to Hasten Death, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2039, 2045
(1994).
29 Orentlicher, Legalization,supra note 27, at 452.
30 Newman, supra note 25, at 171.
I IId. at 172.

20031

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

hopes, loss of control and dignity, misery and pain."' 32 When we "[a]dd to this
enormous costs and the propensity of certain doctors to block out others' suffering,
to avoid contact with the dying, and to neglect available measures for pain relief,...
the picture of an ailing doctor-patient relationship becomes complete. 3
The primary concerns of patients with terminal illnesses are "doctor neglect and
abandonment." 4 "[T]he present system fosters [these maladies] by allowing an
inordinate amount of suffering to continue for months, leading many caregivers to
simply block it out."" When the physician cannot assist in the suicide of a patient
in great suffering, it is often difficult for her to face the patient, and avoidance is
often the only possible response. "By avoiding the hopeless patient and the family,
the doctor learns to live with the brutality of prolonged suffering by disregarding
it."'36 Worse, "[a] doctor's refusal to hasten death 'may be experienced by the
[dying] patient as an abandonment, a rejection, or an expression of inappropriate
'37
paternalistic authority. '
As Justice O'Connor suggested in her concurring opinion in Glucksberg, there
is another choice for physicians. Under the principle of double effect, the physician
may presently prescribe amounts of morphine to patients that they know will hasten
death as long as her primary "intent" is to alleviate the patient's pain.3" This practice
appears more dangerous than the legalization of PAS for two reasons.
First, under double effect, there are no safeguards. As long as the physician
claims she intended to treat her patient's pain, she will avoid liability
notwithstanding questions of consent. Second, because the physician's intent and
not the consent of the patient is controlling, a decision resulting from a meaningful
doctor-patient relationship is not a mandatory prerequisite to suicide. Under double
effect, a physician's unilateral decision to end life is just as valid as a bilateral
decision between doctor and patient.
Further, physicians often use double effect to hasten death after they have
withdrawn life support from a patient.39 When a physician withdraws life support,
the patient will not often die quickly. Thus, physicians must administer morphine
32

Id.(quoting Should Physicians Perform Euthanasia?, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 7, 199 1,

at 12).
3 Newman, supra note 25, at 171.
3 Id.
at 176.
35
36

Id.

Id.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,748 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Block & Billings, supra note 28) (alteration in original).
"' See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-37 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[A] patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain has no legal
barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even
to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.").
" See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
17
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to hasten the dying process.4" If the physician "intended" to cause her patient's
death, however, she would be practicing euthanasia. It would appear this thinly
veiled and unregulated practice could weaken the doctor-patient relationship.
Presently, then, there are several pernicious alternatives available to physicians
and patients. Because PAS is illegal, a patient may be forced to suffer through
terrible pain.4 A sympathetic physician may be able to end this patient's life
through double effect, but there are no safeguards protecting this decision. Finally,
in lieu of physician participation, the patient may attempt to take her own life or
have a family member cause her death. It is unlikely under any of these alternatives
that the physician and patient could have any meaningful discussion about the
patient's desire to die or regulating the dying process.
In contrast, allowing PAS may have the potential to "foster a deeper dimension
'
to some doctor-patient relationships."42
Legalization of PAS "moves it into the
arena for open discussion and consideration."'" Consequently, "a process of
conversation, explanation and negotiation may ensue between doctors and patients
requesting help in ending life."" It is nearly universally accepted that "[d]ying is
one of life's most profound experiences. To share this . . . with another who is
willing to understand and acknowledge this type of suffering, and to act on it, surely
must create one of the most trusted bonds that can be possible."4' 5
At the very least, "[f]or doctors who have longstanding relationships with their
patients, . . . who are attentive to their patient's individual needs, ... heeding a
patient's desire to assist in her suicide would not serve to harm the physician-patient
relationship."46 Finally, the Court's "traditional view of the physician's role" is
simply inapplicable in an age where "physicians are already involved in making
decisions that hasten the death of terminally ill patients - through termination of
life support, withholding of medical treatment, and terminal sedation ...
C. Causation
Some argue that PAS is unacceptable because it forces the physician to become
the cause of death, as opposed to the underlying illness, when life support is

0 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
4' Of course, even if PAS were legal, many terminally ill patients would still choose to
live, and this choice would not be foreclosed by legalization of PAS.
42 Newman, supra note 25, at 171.
41 Id. Currently, however, "[m]aking the practice illegal discourages discussion. One
must be very sure of others' reactions before confiding in them. The useful deliberation that
comes from sharing ideas and perspectives is thereby lost." Id. at 177.
44 Id. at 172.
41 Id. (quoting Should PhysiciansPerform Euthanasia?,supra note 32).
46 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 748 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
47

Id.
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withdrawn. Ironically, however, "if causation were really the issue, assisted suicide
' The physician
would be less problematic morally than withdrawal of treatment."48
has an alternated causal role in the patient's death under PAS because the physician
'
"[B]ecause the patient must selfmerely prescribes a "lethal dose of a drug."49
administer the drug, the patient brings about his or her own death."5
In fact, the physician's act of prescribing the drug is not even always temporally
close to the death of the patient. Often, a physician's lethal prescription will not be
used until "a few weeks or months later in a suicide,"'" if it is used at all. 2
Consequently, a physician practicing PAS would have "a more attenuated role in the
patient's death than the physician whose discontinuation of a ventilator leads to
death in minutes. 3
Furthermore, other factors that normally accompany the withdrawal of life

support make the physician partake in an even more active role in causing death.
"Withdrawal of life support requires physicians or those acting at their direction
physically to remove equipment and, often, to administer palliative drugs which may
themselves contribute to death."'
48 Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 448.
49 Id.
so

Id (emphasis added).

s'Id.

According to the data reported from Oregon in the first year of its Death With Dignity
Act, "23 people received [lethal] prescriptions, 15 of whom used them in hastening
death .... Andrew I.Batavia, So Far So Good Observations on the First Year of Oregon's
Death with Dignity Act, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 291,293 (2000). The data also dispels
the fear that the Act would be overutilized, creating a suicide problem. Instead, "only an
extremely small percentage of people (.05% or 5 people in 10,000) who died in Oregon
received assistance under the Act." Id.
" Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 448. "Moreover, the writing of a
prescription to hasten death, after consultation with a patient, involves a far less active role
for the physician than is required in bringing about death through asphyxiation, starvation
and/or dehydration." Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
14 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729. The court concluded that, as a result of these accompanying
actions, "[tihe ending of life by these means is nothing more nor less than assisted suicide."
Actually, the court was more generous than it needed to be toward withdrawal of life support
in this characterization. Because the physician never administers the drugs under PAS, her
involvement is actually more attenuated than when drugs must be directly administered.
Furthermore, when the physician administers lethal drugs after withdrawing life support,
the argument that the physician did not intend to kill the patient dissipates. The combination
of these two acts reveals that the physician intends, through the entire process, to hasten her
patient's death.
Imagine an ordinary citizen claiming she merely intended to treat her husband's
insomnia after administering a lethal dose of sleeping pills to him. Those who oppose PAS
could counter that the law should treat physicians differently from ordinary citizens because
of their disparate levels of medical knowledge. In reality, however, physicians should be
more culpable than ordinary citizens. An ordinary citizen might honestly have believed she
32
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II. PRESERVING THE SANCTITY OF LIFE
A. Introduction: The Court's Two ProngApproach
The Court has found that the State "has an 'unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life."' 5 Despite this language, the Court made it clear that
this interest does not involve traditional sanctity of life considerations. Instead, the
Court found that, "[w]hile suicide is no longer prohibited or penalized, the ban
against assisted suicide and euthanasia shores up the notion of limits in human
relationships." 6
This appears to be the first prong of the Court's "sanctity of life" argument. As
stated before, however, this is not a literal sanctity argument. Instead, the state
interest actually appears to be the interest in not allowing individuals to assist in the
deaths of other individuals. As such, the interest truly is in placing 'limits on human
relationships' as opposed to protecting the underlying life itself."
The second prong of the interest appears to be preserving the State's interest in
"properly declin[ing] to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular
individual may enjoy."5 " By remaining neutral on such issues, the State can
consistently maintain the proposition "that all persons' lives, from beginning to end,
regardless of physical or mental condition, are under full protection of the law."59
This Section will first analyze why the State's interest in preserving the sanctity
of life is not really about sanctity at all. Second, because PAS is limited to the
was merely treating her spouse's pain in administering a lethal dosage of medication. In
contrast, if anyone should know exactly how much medication can be prescribed without
leading to death, it would be a physician. It is thus disingenuous to say the doctor
administering a lethal dose of morphine does not intend to kill her patient.
" Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261,282 (1990)). Note that the Court takes this interest directly
from its decision in Cruzan, a case dealing with the withdrawal of life support. The Court in
Vacco never explained why this interest applies with any greater force to PAS than to
withdrawal of life support.
56 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
17 Of course, the Court did later recognize that "suicide
is a serious public-health
problem, especially among persons in otherwise vulnerable groups." Id. at 730. While at first
glance this appears to be a strict sanctity of life concern, it is in fact a concern over
depression and various heteronomous factors influencing a patient's decision to end his life.
As such, these arguments will be considered infra in Section IV. See also Note, Physician
Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021,2024 (1992)
("Suicide is not a crime in any state, and state officials cannot take custody of a person who
exhibits suicidal intentions unless the person is certifiably mentally ill. Thus, the crucial issue
is the legality of the physician's act.").
58 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729 (quoting Cruzan,497 U.S. at 282).
9 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729; see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558
(1979).
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terminally ill, it actually coincides with greater limits on human relationships than
does the withdrawal of life support. Finally, because of surrogate decision making
in the withdrawal of life support, these limits are implicated to an even greater
degree when withdrawal of life support is allowed.
B. Why the Sanctity of Life is Not About 'Sanctity'
If the State had a valid interest in preserving the 'sanctity' of life, it could not
reasonably draw a distinction between withdrawal of life support and PAS.
According to the Court, "[t]he distinction comports with fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent."' Whether a physician intends to kill a patient
by withdrawing life support or whether he is the legal cause of that death is
irrelevant to the principle of 'sanctity' of life.
The physician who pulls the plug knows his act will result in the death of his
patient, and yet he does nothing to preserve that life.. Not only does society fail to
intervene, but the Court also explicitly authorizes the act. If the purpose of the
sanctity of life is to preserve all lives without contingency, it is certainly violated
when this withdrawal is allowed."
C. Closeness to Death as a Limit Upon PAS and Withdrawal of Life Support
Under the Court's first prong of reasoning, limits must be placed on human
relationships.62 Under PAS, there is more of a limit than under withdrawal of life
support because, under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, only an adult "suffering
' may be a candidate for PAS. Earlier in the Act, a
from a terminal disease"63
terminal disease is defined as "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death
within six (6) months."' This limitation appears to reinforce the principle that "the
state's interest [in preserving life] lessens as the potential for life diminishes."6' 5
In contrast, New York has held that life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn
even from patients without terminal diseases. In fact, New York has held that
"[p]hysicians can withdraw life-sustaining treatment even when there is a good
o Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997).
61 The Court can attempt to distinguish its interest by labeling PAS as suicide while
holding withdrawal of life support allows a naturaldeath. Linguistics and reasoning aside,
the fact remains that, in either case, a physician stands by when he knows his inaction will
result in a patient's death.
62 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
63 OR. REV. STAT. § 2.01 (1997).
SId.§

1.01.

Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (1996) (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)), rev'd, 521 U.S. 801 (1997).
65
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possibility of significant improvement in the patient's condition." 6'
Opponents of PAS can still argue that, by only allowing those with terminal
illnesses to qualify for PAS, the State is implicitly assuming these individuals have
a lower quality of life than others, implicating the second prong of the State's
interest in preserving the sanctity of life. To a degree, this analysis is misguided.
By legalizing PAS, the State makes no determination on the patient's quality of life.
Instead, it merely recognizes that individuals with terminal illnesses have a
heightened liberty interest in deciding for themselves whether to end their lives that
can trump the State's interest in preserving the sanctity of life.67
Whatever merit remains in the opposition's argument dissipates when viewed
in the context of the Court's decision. Once again, according to the Court,
"[s]uicide is not a crime in any state." 6w' By legalizing PAS, then, the State would
not be giving any license to the terminally ill to take their own lives that other
individuals do not currently hold. The only issue would be whether the terminally
ill should have the additional right of physician assistance. While this clearly raises
questions about implicating the integrity of the medical profession (which have
already been addressed), it raises no additional questions about devaluing the quality
of life of a terminally ill patient.

Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 453 (citing Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551
N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990)). In Nicoleau, the court recognized the right of an adult Jehovah's
Witness to "refuse[] to consent to blood transfusions prior to delivery ofher baby" and "after
losing a substantial amount of blood following the Cesarean birth of [her] child." Nicoleau,
551 N.E.2d at 77, 78.
While the decision involved a Jehovah's Witness, the court did not limit its decision to
a right to the free exercise of religion. Instead, the court recognized that "[t]he citizens of this
State have long had the right to make their own medical care choices without regard to their
physical condition or status as parents." Id. at 84.
In Oregon, the same dichotomy exists. "Assisted suicide may be less susceptible to
abuse because, by law in Oregon, it is limited to terminally ill persons, while treatment can
be withdrawn from any person, regardless of prognosis." David Orentlicher, The
Implementation of Oregon's Death With DignityAct, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 489,493
n.23 (2000) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Implementation].
Of course, most courts have extended a right to refuse medical treatment to an amalgam
of circumstances where the patient's condition could not be described as incurable and
irreversible. Now, "[a]uthorization to withhold or withdraw life support ...extends to the
most basic forms of medical intervention including blood transfusions, artificial nutrition,
and chemotherapy." Cantor, supra note 22, at 1721.
67 Of course, it could still legitimately be argued that the state implicitly judges the
quality of life of terminally ill patients by placing them in this position.
68 See supratext accompanying note 56.
66
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D. Surrogates
1. The Invalidity of Surrogate Decision-Making
With PAS, it is always the patient who consents to ending her life.69 With the
withdrawal of life support, however, it is often not the patient who decides to end
her own life. When the patient is unconscious or unable to give voluntary consent,
either a surrogate or a physician must decide whether to end the patient's life. Based
on this fact alone, there is less of a limit on human relationships with withdrawal of
life support than with PAS.
There are two models under which surrogates make decisions regarding the
withdrawal of life support for unconscious patients. The first of these is the
substituted judgment standard, where the "surrogate decisionmaker attempts to
establish, with as much accuracy as possible, what decision the patient would make
if he were competent to do so."7O The second is the best-interests standard, where
the "surrogate decisionmaker chooses for the incompetent patient which medical
procedures would be in the patient's best interests.'
Surrogate decision making in withdrawal of life support cases is especially
troublesome because "[t]he empirical data indicate[s] . .:.
that surrogates do a poor
72
job of carrying out patients' wishes.
In fact, "[t]hese studies consistently
demonstrate that the potential surrogates' predictions do not reach a statistically
significant degree of agreement with the choices of the individual. 7 1 "This holds
69 Critics can legitimately argue that external pressures may influence this decision, but
it is still the patient who ultimately makes the determination.
70 In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989).
71 Id.Under this standard, the surrogate looks at certain determinative factors such as
degree of suffering and quality of life in arriving at her decision. An initially identifiable
"problem with the best-interests test isthat it lets another make a determination of a patient's
quality of life, thereby undermining the foundation of self-determination and inviolability of
the person upon which the right to refuse medical treatment stands." Id.
72 David Orentlicher, Trends In HealthCareDecisionMaking: The Limits OfLegislation
53 MD. L. REV. 1255, 1278 (1994) (citing Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Proxy
DecisionMakingfor Incompetent Patients:An Ethicaland EmpiricalAnalysis, 267 J. AM.
MED. ASS'N 2067,2069 (1992)) [hereinafter Orentlicher, Limits]. These studies "examined
the accuracy of surrogate decisionmakers by presenting individuals with hypothetical
scenarios and asking them to indicate their treatment preference for each scenario. Potential
surrogates are simultaneously asked to predict the preferences ofthe individual." Orentlicher,
Limits, supra, at 2069.
While the main focus of placing limits on human relationships is to prevent individuals
from having to decide whether other individuals should die, a tertiary focus is to prevent
individuals from wrongly concluding other individuals want to die.
"'Id.
"The empirical studies.., do suggest that proxies are not much better than chance
at predicting patients' preference during incompetence." Id.
at 1278, n.147 (quoting Emanuel
& Emanuel, supra note 72, at 2069).
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true even when individuals chose people that they would feel most comfortable with
as surrogate decisionmakers. '74
This failure on the part of surrogates results from three distinct factors. "First,
most people do not engage in meaningful discussions of their treatment preferences
with close family members or friends."" As a result, "potential surrogates are not
likely to have a good sense of the person's preferences. '76 Thus, when surrogates
act under the substituted judgment standard, they are often forced to make decisions
based on circumstantial and incomplete evidence of the patient's beliefs and values.
Unfortunately, surrogates may be no better off using the best-interests standard.
This is true because "potential surrogates tend to underestimate the quality of life
of the people for whom they will be making medical decisions., 77 Consequently,
78
surrogates "may conclude that treatment is not desired even when it is."
Under either standard, "surrogates may be reluctant to authorize the withholding
of life-sustaining treatment for a family member and thus mistakenly predict a
person's treatment preferences. 79 Surrogates' choices can be prejudiced by factors
such as "[t]he psychological stress of feeling responsible for another person's
death."80
Overall, then, "some factors drive surrogates toward deciding on less treatment
than that which is desired' by patients, while others drive them toward deciding on
more than is desired."'" Unfortunately, these "opposing tendencies generally do not
cancel each other out."8 2 Instead, they "serve to increase the chance of a mismatch,
causing some patients to receive excessive care and others to receive inadequate
care. 8 3
When it is the physician who is deciding whether life support will be withdrawn,
similar problems of consent are present. This is so because studies have shown
"physicians often overr[i]de living wills when they disagree[] with the wisdom of
the patients' choices." 4 "[l]n many cases," however, the patient's preferences do
74 Orentlicher, Limits, supra note 72, at 1278 (citing Jan Hare et al., Agreement Between
Patientsand Their Self-Selected Surrogates on Difficult MedicalDecisions, 152 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1049, 1052 (1992)).
" Orentlicher, Limits, supranote 72, at 1278.
76 Id.
77

7

Id.

Id. at 1279.

SId. "Close family members may have a strong feeling ... that they do not wish to
witness the continuation of the life -of a loved one which they regard as hopeless,
meaningless, and even degrading." Id. at 1280, n. 158 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of
Health,497 U.S. 261,286 (1990)).
80 Orentlicher, Limits, supra note 72, at 1280.
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id at 1283. "[P]hysicians probably overrode patients preferences a majority ofthe time
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not even come into play because, "when the patient [is] transferred from the nursing
home to a hospital, the patient's living will [does] not accompany the patient and [is]
therefore not incorporated into the patient's hospital chart." 8"
Still, even when the patient is accompanied by her living will, there is no
guarantee her preference will be honored. "In some cases ...physicians provide[]
undesired treatment because they [feel] that the treatment [is] appropriate. In other
cases, they [withhold] desired treatment because they believe[] that the treatment
[will] not benefit the patient."86
2. Surrogate Decision-Making and the Quality of Life
Because surrogates, and sometimes the courts, are forced to consider the
patient's quality of life in making a withdrawal decision, the withdrawal of life
support also implicates the second prong of the state's interest. In In re Beth Israel
Medical Center," "[a] New York court established twelve factors to determine the
best interests of an incompetent individual, including age, degree of pain and
suffering, degree of disability and dependency, quality of life, views of the
individual's family members and physician, and type of care required if life is
prolonged."88
When it is simply a surrogate such as a family member or physician making the
decision to terminate life support under this standard, the State does remain neutral
on the patient's quality of life although someone other than the patient must judge
the worth of his life. 89 In some cases, however, the decision to end life does not end
with the surrogate. In these jurisdictions, "the intervention of ajudge" is required
to determine whether the surrogate's decision was proper." Practically, when courts
must make this decision, the State is deciding on the quality of life of the patient.
Legally, "[t]hat the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by

when there was a disagreement between the patient and physician." Id.
at 1282-83.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1283 (citation omitted).
87 519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1987).
8s Teresa Harvey Paredes, The Killing Words? How the New Quality-of-Life Ethic Affects
People with Severe Disabilities,46 SMU L. REv. 805, 830 (1993) (citing In re Beth Israel,
519 N.Y.S.2d 511 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1987)) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Also note
the degree to which this analysis diametrically opposes the state interest "that all persons'
lives, from beginning to end, regardless of physical or mental condition, [be] under the full
protection of the law." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 729 (1997). By including
age and degree of disability as factors, it is clear that not all individuals are treated equally
under the law.
89 Further, when the views of family members and physicians are part of a calculus,
another limit on human relationships is removed.
o In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (1989).
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decisions of" the Supreme Court.9
III. PROTECTING THE POOR, THE ELDERLY, AND THE
DISABLED FROM EXPLOITATION

A. Introduction
The Supreme Court found that "the State has an interest in protecting vulnerable
groups - including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons - from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes."'92 This interest recognizes "the real risk of subtle coercion
and undue influence in end-of-life decisions."93 The Court found that "[a]n
insidious bias against the handicapped - again coupled with a cost-saving
'
mentality - makes them especially in need of... statutory protection." 94
To begin, even by the Court's own analysis, there is no reason to distinguish
PAS from withdrawal of life support. The Court merely applied its analysis of the
risk of coercion from Cruzan, a case concerning the withdrawal of life support, to
PAS.9" By the Court's own analysis, then, a petitioner seeking to hasten his death
should be required to meet certain standards to have her wish fulfilled, but she
should not be prohibited from ending her life." Further, the Court never presented
any independent evidence as to why PAS should present any risks to vulnerable
groups.97
This Section will argue that the initial reports on Oregon's Death With Dignity
Act have shown no evidence of the exploitation of vulnerable groups. Second,
reasons will be presented as to why the poor, the elderly, and the disabled are more
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (finding the requisite state action when a
court enforced a private, racially-restrictive covenant).
92 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
9' Id. at 732 (citing Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990)).
94 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732 (quotingCompassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d
586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995)). "If physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many might resort
to it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-of-life health-care costs."
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
95 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
9
"[W]e should respond to the risk of noncompliance with assisted suicide regulations
in the same way that we respond to the risk of noncompliance with treatment withdrawal
regulations, unless there is some other reason to treat the two practices differently."
Orentlicher, Implementation, supra note 66, at 500. In fact, because the patient herself is
making the choice rather than a surrogate, arguably, PAS may require fewer safeguards than
those required for the withdrawal of life support.
" In challenging the Appellate Court's characterization of this risk as "ludicrous on its
face," the Glucklberg Court merely responded by citing Cruzan. Under an Equal Protection
analysis, this actually weakens the Court's argument. Because the Court did not expound on
this analysis in Vacco, it is left with no support.
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susceptible to exploitation through withdrawal of life support than through PAS.
B. Oregon's Death With Dignity Act and Vulnerable Groups
In Oregon, the initial report98 on its Death With Dignity Act "shows no
indication of exploitation of vulnerable populations."" In fact, "preliminary data
from Oregon suggest that such abuse is not occurring" for any of the vulnerable
groups identified by the Court." °
"[O]f the people who requested information and considered assisted suicide,
over half were men, all were Caucasian, and none had a disability (except for
functional limitations secondary to their primary condition)."'' More significantly,
"[t]he Health Division Report found that the control patients studied did not differ
statistically from the patients who received prescriptions with respect to age,
education, or insurance status and similarly concluded that there is no evidence to
support concerns that physician-assisted suicide was forced on any members of
these groups."'0 2
This Report shows that there is not even a correlation between wealth, age, or
disability and whether a patient participated in PAS." °3 These numbers support the
conclusion that the Court's inclusion of the above groups was nothing more than a
"blanket characterization[]."'" They further support those who "have concluded
that those individuals who are in fact vulnerable should and will be protected by the
safeguards of the law."'05
One of the safeguards of the law is that, before a patient can receive assistance,
"[t]he patient must make one written request and two oral requests to his or her
physician, and the two oral requests must be separated by at least 15 days.'
Before a patient can receive his prescription, "[t]he physician and a consultant must
confirm the diagnosis of a terminal condition, determine that the patient is
competent to make the decision, and refer the patient to counseling if either believes
the patient's judgment is impaired by depression or another psychiatric or
psychological disorder."' 1 7 Finally, "[t]he physician must also inform that patient
9 Arthur E. Chin et al., Legalized Physician-AssistedSuicide in Oregon - The First
Year's Experience, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 577 (1999).
9 Cantor & Thomas, supra note 25, at 162.
'00 Batavia, supra note 52, at 295.
101 Id.

Id2d. at 295-96.
course, to prove its theory, the Court would have to determine that the higher

103 Of

burden of causation was met and not simply that the two variables coincide.
104 Batavia, supra note 52, at 295.
105 ld.
I6 Id at 294.
107

Id.
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of all feasible alternatives, including hospice, palliative care, and aggressive pain
control."'0 8

As an even further precaution, "the Oregon State Assembly recently amended
the Death with Dignity Act to provide that 'No person shall qualify under the
provisions of [the Act] solely because of age or disability."" 0 9 The presence of this
additional safeguard, in addition to the success of the Oregon Death With Dignity
Act, suggests that a legalized, regulated system of PAS should and can be effective
in protecting potentially vulnerable groups.
Of course, Oregon is not the only state where PAS occurs. Even in these other
states, without the safeguards of Oregon, "evidence grows that underground
euthanasia occurs at a significant rate without any indications of exploitation of
vulnerable populations." "0 Still, underground euthanasia and PAS lack the
protective safeguards of a regulated and legalized scheme such as that in Oregon.
"[T]he problem with an underground practice of assisted suicide is that there are no
second opinions, and nobody looking out for the best interests of the patients if they
are weak and susceptible to suggestion.""' When "we restrict euthanasia to the
realm of covert action, we thereby run added risks of mistake and abuse.""' 2
At a minimum, "[tIhe patient who asks to be allowed to die by removal from a
ventilator is at least as likely as a patient who requests a prescription for lethal drugs
to be making the request because of undue influence, financial pressure, clinical
depression, or inadequately treated pain.""' 3 Furthermore, "these extraneous
pressures would also potentially impact in a disproportionate manner on vulnerable
' 4
populations such as the elderly, the poor, and the disabled."

Id
Id. at 296 (quoting 1999 Or. Laws 423, § 2 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805
(2001)).
"o Cantor & Thomas, supra note 25, at 164 n.292; see also Washignton v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 749 n.12 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing a study finding "that 12% of
physicians polled in Washington State reported that they had been asked by their terminally
ill patients for prescriptions to hasten death, and that, in the year prior to the study, 24% of
those physicians had complied with such requests"); id. (citing a report finding that " 8%of
responding Michigan oncologists reported active participation in assisted suicide").
"' Kim C. Arestad, Vacco v. Quill and the Debate Over Physician-AssistedSuicide: Is
the Right to Die Protectedby the FourteenthAmendment?, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J.HUM. RTS. 511,
550 n.283 (1999) (citing Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit;A.B.A.J., Sept.
1997, at 52).
112 Newman, supra note 25, at 177; see also George D. Lundberg, 'It's Over Debby'and
the EuthanasiaDebate, 259 J.AM. MED. AsS'N 2142 (1988).
"' Cantor & Thomas, supra note 25, at 161 (quoting LANCE K. STELL, PHYSICIAN
ASSISTED SUICIDE 225, 247 (Margaret P. Battin et al. eds., 1988)).
108

109

114 Id.
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C. The Poor
There is at least a cognizable argument that poor individuals could be at a
heightened risk of persuasion from other family members and physicians to
terminate life support."' This is because "[p]atients dependent on ventilators or
dialysis consume more resources than patients who are not so dependent, and
patients can live many more years, even decades, while being sustained on artificial
life supports.""' 6 Thus, "resource constraints are even more likely to cause
premature withdrawals of life-sustaining treatment""' 7 than they are to cause PAS.
These "premature withdrawals" can come about because "the lack of access to
health care may cause patients to reluctantly request or accede to a suggestion that
they forgo life-sustaining treatment because they cannot afford the treatment they
need and want.""' 8 More remotely yet more perniciously, "[p]hysicians [could]
subtly or heavy-handedly pressure patients into forgoing life-sustaining treatment
by telling them that it is useless, painful, and expensive.""' 9
In fact, there is even evidence that this "implicit rationing" is already occurring.
More than one source has commented that "physicians routinely engage in the
practice of consciously making clinical compromises that result in some potentially
beneficial treatment being withheld from their patients for financial reasons."' 20
"' Alternatively, when the patient is unconscious, these pressures can directly influence
the surrogate making the final determination between life and death.
116 Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 460. For instance, "[w]hen the United
States Supreme Court was deciding whether to permit the withdrawal of Nancy Cruzan's
feeding tube, the costs of her care were reported to be more than $130,000 per year, and she
survived nearly eight years in her persistent vegetative state before her treatment was
discontinued." Cantor & Thomas, supra note 25, at 161 (quoting STELL, supra note 113, at
247).
117 Id.
118 Alan Meisel, Physician-AssistedSuicide: A Common Law Roadmapfor State Courts,
24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817, 855 (1997).
" Id.While the prospect that physicians could knowingly force patients into choosing
withdrawal of life support may be speculative, there is a real danger that its legalization has
caused a form of tacit acceptance in the medical community leading to more subtle
persuasion. According to this theory, "[p]hysicians can... become hardened to the plight
of the terminally ill by the knowledge that forgoing life-sustaining treatment is an easy out
for the physician." Id.
120 Marshall B. Kapp, De Facto Health-CareRationing by Age The Law Has No
Remedy, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 330 (1998); see also id. at 333 (finding that premature
withdrawal of life support can result from physicians "responding to concerns about
excessive health-care costs, especially in the light of the direct and indirect cost-containment
incentives promoted by today's pervasive managed care environments"); David A.Arsch &
Peter A. Ubel, Rationingby Any Other Name, 336 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1668 (1997); Michael
J. Stauss et al., Rationing ofIntensive Care Unit Services: An Everyday Occurrence,255 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1143 (1986).
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D. The Elderly
There is also a valid argument that the elderly are open for exploitation under
the present scheme where surrogates can decide to withdraw life support under a
substituted judgment or best interests analysis. "[S]tudies confirm that family
members consistently underestimate the quality of life of elderly persons."''
Concurrently, "[p]hysicians also consistently underestimate the quality of life of
elderly patients."' 22
Because of these dual underestimations, both physicians and family members
"may conclude that treatment is not desired even when it is."'2 On one level, in the
majority of cases, this can lead to complete withdrawal of life support without the
requirement of a court order.2 On another level, physicians underestimating their
patient's desire to live are often "likely to recommend less aggressive care to
surrogates than the patient would desire."' 25
Others have also claimed that the same "implicit rationing" mentioned above' 26
27
"has the effect of discriminating at the bedside against patients who are elderly."'1
Of particular concern is "the apparently widespread practice of unilaterally
withholding more expensive forms of medical care in the absence of, or even
'2
contrary to, the older person's or surrogate's own informed decision."' 1
121 Orentlicher,

Limits, supranote 72, at 1278-79 (citing Emanuel & Emanuel, supranote

72, at 2069).
112 Orentlicher, Limits, supra note 72, at 1279 (citing Richard F. Uhlmann & Robert A.
Pearlman, PerceivedQuality ofLife andPreferencesfor Life-Sustaining Treatmentin Older
Adults, 151 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 495 (1991); Robert A. Pearlman & Richard F,
Uhlmann, Quality of Life in Chronic Disease: Perceptions of Elderly Patients, 43 J.
GERONTOLOGY M25, M27 (1988)).
123
Id.

124

See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987).

12'

Orentlicher, Limits, supranote 72, at 1279. This is especially true because "a relatively

high proportion of elderly people desire intensive intervention to prolong their lives." Id. at

1279 n.151 (quoting Joseph G.Ouslander et al., Health CareDecisionsAmong ElderlyLongTerm Care Residents and Their Potential Proxies, 149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1367,
1371 (1989).
126
127

See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
Kapp, supranote 120, at 330. For instance, in one study, "almost half of the[] very old

patients had some limitation placed on their care." Id (quoting K.A. Hesse, Terminal Care
of the Very Old. Changes in the Way We Die, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1513, 1517
(1995)).

Kapp, supranote 120, at 330-31. Again, this discrimination need not result from
overt
discrimination against the elderly. Instead, "[tihis phenomenon may occur, for example,
when patient age is silently factored into individual caregivers' decisions to admit patients
to the hospital, provide intensive care, terminate therapy, or initiate vigorous treatment." Id.
at 331. One explanation for why "we spend fewer Medicare dollars on the final two years
of life for a 90-year-old than for a 70-year-old... is that physiciarts are.., less aggressive
S128
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Others have gone farther and claimed that age discrimination is the purpose, and
not merely the effect, of physician's decisions. These individuals argue that
there is ample evidence in the medical sciences literature that individual
bedside decisions about the distribution of health resources not
infrequently are made by physicians on the basis of the patient's age,
even when potential confounding variables such as prognosis and
severity of illness have been controlled for in the analysis.'2 9
Decisions regarding withdrawal of life support and other end-of-life decisions
are not immune from this discrimination. Thus, "[ollder patients are more likely
than their younger counterparts to be the recipients of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR)
orders when all other conditions are equal."130 In addition, "[w]hen attempted
resuscitation is initiated for cardiopulmonary arrest, the elderly frequently receive
shorter trials of advanced cardiac life support before death is declared."' 3' Finally,
in hospitalizing their oldest patients and initiating tests and treatments for them." Id.
(quoting
A.M. Kramer, Health Carefor Elderly Persons- Myths and Realities, 332 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1027, 1028 (1995)).
129 Kapp, supranote 120, at 331. "[R]ationing by age at the individual bedside may be the
result of the physician's own often unconscious bias and prejudice regarding the elderly in other words, ageism, acting alone or in combination with therapeutic miscalculations
and/or financial incentives." Id.
at 333 (footnote omitted). "[A]ge discrimination may... be
practised at a primitive, subcortical level with aged patients being accorded substandard
treatment simply through the exercise of knee-jerk responses based on blind prejudice." Id.
(quoting Editorial, Do DoctorsShort-ChangeOld People?, 342 LANCET I(1993)) (alteration
and omission in original).
130 Kapp, supranote 120, at 331 (citing K. Boyd et al., The Relationship Between Age and
the Use of DNR Orders in CriticalCare Patients: Evidence for Age Discrimination,156
ARCHIVES. INTERNAL MED. 1821 (1996)).

Further note how sources arguing against such discrimination fall into the same kind of
logic the Court is fearful will result if PAS is legalized. In Glucksberg, the Court held that
[t]he State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives
of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the
lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled person's suicidal
impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone else's.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
According to one source, "[h]igher rates for DNR orders represent provider
responsiveness to elderly patients' own values and preferences." K.E. Rosenfeld & N.S.
Wenger, Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders in the Elderly: Age Discrimination or Patient
Preference?, 157 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1041 (1997). This type of rationalization
currently existing under a policy that allows withdrawal of life support reflects exactly the
type of stigmatization the Court seeks to avoid by banning PAS. For evidence that the above
rationalization is fallacious, see supra text accompanying note 102.
'.. Kapp, supranote 120, at 331-32 (citing T.R. Fried et al., The Association BetweenAge
of HospitalizedPatientsand the Delivery ofAdvanced CardiacLife Support, II J.GENERAL
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"[a]dvanced age has been identified as an independent risk factor for discontinuation
of [long term] dialysis ....
,
This "discrimination appears to be the most pronounced in the case of the
'oldest old.' ', 133 Often, "the oldest old patients are not offered aggressive care solely
34
because of advanced age."'
E. The Disabled
There is also good reason to believe that, with regard to the disabled, "[t]he
potential for abuse is actually greater in the case of withdrawal of life support""'
than in the case of PAS. As is the case for the poor and elderly, "[t]he potential for
abuse is greater... because the person with the disability may not be conscious."' 36
When the patient is unconscious, often the court must enter into a best interests
analysis to determine whether to discontinue life support. In many states, including
New York, the "degree of disability and dependency"'' 37 is factored into this
calculation. As a result, "[fi]f the decision-maker determines that life with severe
mental disabilities is undesirable, or that being physically dependent is undesirable,
3
nontreatment can be justified."'
When the patient is conscious, however, courts are no less reliant on factoring
disability into their calculation of whether a request to have life support withdrawn
should be granted. In McKay v. Bergstedt, a9 the Nevada Supreme Court upheld a
trial court's order granting the request of a quadriplegic patient to have his ventilator
removed. "The court acknowledged that McKay was requesting the right to
affirmatively hasten his death and that had McKay not been disabled, his liberty
interest would not outweigh the state's interest ... .,"4 0
The court found that, "[i]f a competent adult is beset with an irreversible
257, 260 (1996)).
32 Kapp, supranote 120, at 332 (citing S.Neu & C.M. Kjellstrand, Stopping Long Term
Dialysis: An Empirical Study of Withdrawal of Life-Support Treatment, 314 NEw ENG. J.
INTERNAL MED.

MED. 14, 18 (1986)).

"I Kapp, supra note 120, at 332.
114Id.at 332-33 (citing T.T. Perls & E.R. Wood, Acute CareCosts of the Oldest Old, 156
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 754, 758 (1996)). As a result, "[i]n the acute hospital setting, less
is spent per admission on persons over age 80 than on younger elderly patients." Id.
' Andrew I. Batavia, The Relevance of Dataon Physiciansand Disability on the Right
to Assisted Suicide, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 546, 549 (2000).
136 Id. at 549n.12.
' Paredes, supranote 89, at 830 (citing In re Beth IsraelMed Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 511,
517 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1987)).
138 Paredes, supranote 89, at 830. This standard "devalue[s] a person's life on the basis
of mental disability or physical dependency." Id.
"9 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
140 Paredes, supra note 89; at 826.
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condition such as quadriplegia, where life must be sustained artificially and under
circumstances of total dependence, the adult's attitude or motive may be presumed
not to be suicidal.' 41 "In other words," according to the court, "the desire to die is
42
entirely rational for a person with severe physical disabilities."'
The stigma placed upon the disabled is even more evident in the court's
discussion of maintaining the integrity of the medical profession. The court argued
that the medical profession's integrity was not at stake because "nontreatment is
justified when treatment 'will do little or nothing more than delay death in a bodily
' '' 43
environment essentially bereft of quality.
Bergstedt reflects the general legal trend toward classifying the disabled as
especially likely candidates for withdrawal of life support. "An examination into
recent court cases ... reveals a growing number of people with disabilities are
'qualify[ing]' for such elimination, on the basis that their lives lack meaning or
quality."'"4 This classification is further compounded by physician prejudice against
145
the disabled.
IV. PREVENTING A SLIPPERY SLOPE TO VOLUNTARY
AND INVOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA

A. Introduction
The Supreme Court found that "the State may fear that permitting assisted
suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia.', 46 Euthanasia occurs when a physician, rather than the patient,
administers a lethal dosage of drugs to the patient. The Court felt that "[i]f suicide
is protected as a matter of constitutional right, . . . 'every man and woman in the
United States must enjoy it. ' ' 47 To support this opinion, the Court followed a few
interconnected logical chains.
First, "the 'decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal
purposes the decision of the patient himself."1 48 It would then follow, according to
14' Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 627; see also Paredes, supra note 89, at 826. "McKay did not

want to commit suicide; he merely wanted to be freed from his 'paralytic prison from which
there was no hope of release other than death."' Id. (quoting Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 626).
141 Paredes, supra note 89, at 826.
'41 Id. (quoting Bergestedt, 801 P.2d at 628) (emphasis
added).
144 Paredes, supra note 89, at 822 (alteration in original).
41 See id. at 831 ("Doctor recommendations are too often clouded by their own negative
attitude toward disabled people.").
146 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997).
141 Id. at 733 (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
1995), rev'den banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)).
148

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 733 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 832 n.120). If
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the Court, that soon surrogates would be empowered to choose PAS for an
incompetent patient. Second, "in some instances, the patient may be unable to selfadminister the drugs and... administration by the physician... may be the only
way the patient may be able to receive them."' 49 Alternatively, there is the risk "that
not only physicians, but also family members and loved ones, will inevitably
participate in assisting suicide."' 50
This Section will argue that the Court's claim of an inevitable slippery slope
from PAS to voluntary and involuntary euthanasia is internally inconsistent with the
legal dichotomy drawn by the Court in Vacco. Also, it will be argued that the
Court's citation of the Netherlands as an example of a country plagued by PAS
abuses is invalid because Dutch policy is substantively distinct from the policy in
existence in Oregon.
B. The Slippery Slope as a Legal Argument
To the extent these "slippery slope" arguments are strictly legal arguments, the
Court's analysis fails. The easiest place to look for where legal distinction can be
drawn is in the Court's own opinion in Vacco. According to the Court, the state
interests it identifies are sufficient to justify a continuing ban on PAS while
maintaining the legality of withdrawal of life support. If there is any justification
for this distinction, 5 ' there should be equally valid grounds upon which the Court
can distinguish between PAS and euthanasia.
The first State interest identified by the Court is the "unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life."'5 As previously stated, however, according to the
Court, this is not really an interest in preserving the sanctity of life because "suicide
is no longer prohibited or penalized."' 53 Instead, "the ban ...shores up the notion
the Court were really concerned about the decisions of surrogates, it would be more
concerned with the withdrawal of life support where surrogate decision making is prevalent.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 733 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 831).
o Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 733 (paraphrasing Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 831
n. 140). Of course, the Court never addressed the probability that family members are more
likely to assist in a family member's suicide when a physician is not allowed to assist. It also
never addressed why family members would want to assist in suicides when a medical
professional is legally allowed to hasten death. Consider the (admittedly weak) analogy to
abortion. Is it more likely that family members (and indeed the pregnant woman herself)
engaged in "self-help" before or after the Court found a Constitutionally protected right to
abortion?
'5' And, of course, ifthere is not, the Court's decision in Vacco is constitutionally invalid.
152 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 282 (1990)).
...
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 729. Of course, this could also force the Court to prohibit
capital punishment. While some may view this as an inconsistency of the proposed
limitation, it is in fact another potential critique of the Court's shifting view of the role of
'4
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'
of limits in human relationships."154
Really, then, the interest involves the State
desiring to place limits upon the "harm" one individual can inflict upon another
individual.
Based upon the Court's analysis in Vacco, physicians should be limited from
prescribing lethal drugs to their patients, but they should not be limited from
withdrawing life support from a dependent patient. If this distinction were valid,
there is no reason a further distinction between PAS and euthanasia could not also
be valid. The Court could simply say that the notion that no person shall be allowed
to actively and directly kill another person is a limit that must be placed on all
human relationships.' 55
The second state interest is the "interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of
the medical profession."'5 6 There are two key distinctions between the physician's
role in euthanasia and PAS. First, in PAS, the patient, rather than the physician,
must administer the lethal medication. Second, because of the nature of
prescriptions, the patient often does not take the lethal drugs until weeks or months
after the physician prescribes them.
The Court and the American Medical Association have found that, when a
physician withdraws life support from a patient, she is acting within the canons of
medical ethics because it is the underlying natural causes that take the patient's
life.'
At the same time, both bodies have found PAS unacceptable because it
places physicians in the role of killers of their patients.'
If such a distinction is valid, certainly the Court could find a physician who
actively kills her patient through the administration of drugs implicates the integrity
of the medical profession to a higher degree than the physician who merely
prescribes these drugs. Both of these arguments appear suspect, but the important
point is merely that this proposed distinction is no less plausible than the Court's
current line drawing. If neither of these arguments is compelling, the Court's
distinction between withdrawal of life support and PAS is invalid to begin with and
should be overturned. 59

physicians in the dying process.
154 Id.
Because the patient self-administers the lethal drugs under PAS, the physician does not
directly cause death.
56 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 731.
117 Vacco v.Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997); AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE
OF MEDICAL ETHICS
§ 2.20 (2002).
...Vacco, 521 U.S. at 801; AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 2.211 (2002).
159 Justice Souter argues in the alternative:
The case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here, not because recognizing
one due process right would leave a court with no principled basis to avoid
recognizing another, but because there is a plausible case that the right claimed
would not be readily containable by reference to facts about the mind that are
matters of difficult judgment, or by gatekeepers who are subject to temptation,

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:779

C. The Dutch Analogy
The Court further supports its slippery slope arguments through use of the
Netherlands as an analogy. "The Dutch government's own study revealed that in
1990, there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia ... ,400 cases of assisted
suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit request. ' '16 °
Further, "the study found an additional 4,941 cases where physicians administered
' 61
lethal morphine overdoses without the patients' explicit consent."'
The Court's analogy is fallacious in at least two essential regards. First, until
recently (and when the above statistics were reported), "[i]n Holland, assisted
suicide [was] officially illegal[] but [was] typically not prosecuted under certain
specified circumstances.' 6 2 In contrast, "[iln Oregon, assisted suicide is officially
noble or not.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring).
First, it should be noted that this same risk applies with greater force to the withdrawal
of life support. See supra Section II.D. Further, it would seem likely that there is more risk
that such abuses would occur when there are not guidelines that allow a physician to assist
a patient in taking his own life. When PAS is illegal, it is subject to more abuse because it
is practiced in a clandestine manner, often by family members, and without safeguards. See
supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
160 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734.
61 d. It should be noted that this latter practice is closely akin to the 'double effect'
utilized by many physicians in the United States. In fact, in Glucksberg, Justice O'Connor
even recognized that "a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is
experiencing great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified
physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness andhastening death." Id. at 736-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
In addition, the fact that euthanasia was administered in many cases without the patient's
explicit consent is not dispositive of the issue of voluntariness. "[T]he absence of a
contemporaneous request does not automatically mean that the patient's death is inconsistent
with the patient's wishes." Orentlicher, Implementation, supra note 66, at 500. Often,
"patients had expressed their desire for euthanasia but were no longer able to communicate
at the time of their death. In these cases, euthanasia may well have been exactly what the
patient wanted." Id.
In other cases, the patient had not made a request and was unconscious when the
physician performed euthanasia. In these cases, either the physician or a family member
used substituted judgment or a best-interests standard. Unless the Court is arguing that
withdrawal of life support performed under similar standards in "involuntary," it cannot
make a similar argument with regard to euthanasia.
162 Batavia, supra note 52, at 301; see also Maria Angel, Euthanasiain the NetherlandsGood News or Bad?, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1676 (1996); Paul J. van der Mass et al.,
Euthanasia,Physician-AssistedSuicide and Other Medical PracticesInvolving the End of
Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996); Gerrit van der Wal,
Evaluationof the Notification Procedurefor Physician-AssistedDeath in the Netherlands,
335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1706 (1996).
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legal under specified circumstances and is illegal under all other circumstances." ' 63
If anything, the non-prosecution policy in the Netherlands is more closely
analogous to current PAS policy in all of the other United States besides Oregon.
In every other state, PAS is officially illegal, but no physician has ever been
prosecuted for assisting in a suicide. In fact, Jack Kevorkian was acquitted
numerous times for assisting in suicides before he was finally convicted for
euthanizing a patient.164 In contrast, Oregon has legalized PAS as long as the
physician complies with certain safeguards and reporting requirements. Oregon's
Death With Dignity Act explicitly legalizes PAS and places it into the public sphere
for regulation and observation. To compare this to a system where PAS was not
65
officially legalized until recently is patently unfair.
Second, "[i]n Holland, the nonprosecution policy applies in certain cases of
euthanasia, as well.as assisted suicide."'' 66 "In Oregon, euthanasia.., is illegal in
all cases and under all circumstances."' 167 The Court was concerned with a slippery
slope to both voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. With regard to the former, "the
fact that euthanasia occurs in a country that condones euthanasia tells us little about
what will happen in another jurisdiction that does not condone such a practice."' 68
The fact that involuntary euthanasia is reported in the Netherlands also is largely
irrelevant. When some form of euthanasia is legalized in a jurisdiction, it is much
more likely that physicians will report when they participate in euthanasia. 69 It
therefore follows that more cases of involuntary euthanasia will be reported in such
a jurisdiction.170
163 Batavia,

supra note 52, 301.
'
See Liz Townsend, Kevorkian's Nine-Year EuthanasiaCrusade Leads to Murder
Conviction, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE NEWS, Apr. 8, 1999 ("Jack Kevorkian finally faces jail
time for killing a desperate man ... by lethal injection, administered directly by Kevorkian
and nationally televised on 60 Minutes.. . ."). Kevorkian had previously undergone three
trials, which ended in acquittal, one mistrial, and various court cases" without convictions.
65 Now that the Netherlands has officially legalized PAS and euthanasia, it will be
interesting to see how their statistics change. It is important that these statistics be analyzed
in the proper light. Many may construe any reported abuses and involuntary deaths as
evidence of the flaws of legalized PAS and euthanasia. However, the relevant consideration
should be whether the number of reported abuses increases or decreases from the number
that currently exist under the non-prosecution policy. The change should indicate whether
explicit legalization or a passive non-prosecution policy leads to more non-voluntary deaths.
" Batavia, supra note 52, at 301.
167 Id.
168

Id.

By contrast, when euthanasia is categorically prohibited, physicians are faced with the
.choice of not reporting versus reporting and facing prosecution for their participation.
171 In a jurisdiction where euthanasia is illegal, any physician reporting participation in
euthanasia would be subject to prosecution. In ajurisdiction where euthanasia is not illegal,
however, there is no less reason for a physician to report her participation in euthanasia than
there is for her to report participation in a hysterectomy or physical exam.
169
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The number of reportedcases of involuntary euthanasia, however, is irrelevant.
"[T]he appropriate question is whether involuntary euthanasia occurs more
frequently where there is a specific law that legalizes the practice under very specific
guidelines or where there is a law totally prohibiting the practice ... ,"' This is a
question that simply cannot be answered by comparing reported numbers among
jurisdictions where physicians have entirely different motivations for reporting (or
not reporting) their participation.
The fact that abuses are reported in the Netherlands, however, is relevant for one
purpose. According to opponents of PAS, the statistics in Oregon are inherently
unreliable because "physicians who engage in such conduct obviously would not
report it."' 72 The fact that numerous reports of abuse do occur in the Netherlands
suggests one of two conclusions.
First, when abuses occur, they are reported, and the absence of such reports in
Oregon makes it likely such abuses are not occurring. Second, because the PAS and
euthanasia policies in the Netherlands are so different from the Death With Dignity
Act, physicians are more likely to report abuses in the Netherlands. This means that
either the analogy is invalid or that it is valid but reveals that Oregon does not suffer
from a slippery slope.'73
However, even if there were the slightest risk of such a slippery slope, it would
apply with at least equal force to the current right to withdrawal of life support.
Arguably, "all of the 'slippery slope' arguments made for prohibiting assisted
suicide are also arguments for prohibiting the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment."'74 In actuality, the possibility of a slippery slope is much more likely
with withdrawal of life support than with legalized PAS.
Withdrawal of life support is much more akin to the involuntary euthanasia
performed in the Netherlands for a few reasons. "Most importantly," as with many
cases involving withdrawal of life support, "most of the abuse in the Netherlands
involves euthanasia of persons who lack decision-making capacity at the time
euthanasia is performed."' 75 Under Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and by
definition,' 76 an individual choosing PAS must be "capable" and must have
"voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die."' 77
The abuses of euthanasia in the Netherlands, then "demonstrate... the risks of
71 Batavia,

supra note 52, at 301.
Id. at 295 (citing Margot White & Daniel Callahan, Oregon's First Year: The
Medicalizationof Control, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 331-41 (2000)).
' Because the reporting in the Netherlands was anonymous, it is likely the latter
conclusion is correct, further weakening the Court's analogy.
' Orentlicher, Implementation, supra note 66, at 493.
17' Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 461-62.
17, Under PAS, the patient must be the one self-administering the drugs. In order to ingest
the drugs, the patient must have a minimum of mental capacity.
177 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2001).
172
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permitting euthanasia - not assisted suicide. With a right to assisted suicide, the
patient must perform the life-ending act; accordingly, persons lacking decision78
making capacity would not have their lives ended by others inappropriately."'
This risk of lives ending inappropriately does exist to a substantial degree with
the withdrawal of life support. Factors pushing relatives' and physicians' hands can
include financial strain, limited resources, and under- or over-estimation of the
patient's quality of life. Potentially, "[I]ife-sustaining treatment might [even] be
withdrawn from incompetent patients . . . on the basis of decisions by family
members who are driven by their self-interest rather than by the wishes of the
17
patient."' 1
In addition, "[s]tudies have consistently shown that physicians do not comport
with ethical principles when implementing treatment withdrawals." 8 ' In one "study
of living wills, physicians overrode a patient's treatment preference twenty-five
percent of the time, and, in three-quarters of those overrides, the physician withheld
treatment desired by the patient."' 81 Again, "[w]ith a right to assisted suicide, the
patient must perform the life ending act; accordingly, persons lacking decisionmaking capacity would not have their lives ended by others inappropriately."' 82
CONCLUSION

There is no evidence that PAS poses a more substantial threat than withdrawal
of life to the state interests identified by the Court in Vacco v. Quill. In fact, because
patients are often incompetent when they are on life support, the probability that the
wishes of these patients will not be honored is higher even than that of competent
patients choosing PAS.
As a result, surrogates must decide whether the patient's life is worth living
under withdrawal of life support, and thus the state's interest in the sanctity of life
is threatened. Because these decisions also frequently involve disabilities, the age
of the patient, and limited resources, vulnerable groups face a potentially higher
degree of exploitation. To the extent the abuses plaguing the Netherlands surround
incompetent patients, the risk of a slippery slope is more pronounced when
withdrawal of life support is legalized.
The only cognizable argument that applies with equal force against PAS is that
Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 462. "Because assisted suicide is
performed by a competent patient, and life-sustaining treatment can be withdrawn from
incompetent patients, it is quite possible that it is less susceptible to abuse than treatment
withdrawal." Orentlicher, Implementation, supra note 66, at 493 n.23.
119 Id. at 493.
180 Orentlicher, Legalization, supra note 27, at 461.
1d ; see also Marion Danis et al., A ProspectiveStudy ofAdvance Directivesfor LifeSustainingCare, 324 NEw ENG. J.MED. 882, 884-85 (1991).
82 Orentlicher, Legalization,supra note 27, at 462.
7
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its legalization would harm the integrity of the medical profession. However,
physicians are no longer viewed solely as healers, and the principle of double effect,
which can be unilateral, poses greater dangers to the physician-patient relationship
than does PAS.
The Court was correct in one sense: Patients seeking withdrawal of life support
and those seeking PAS are not similarly situated. Unfortunately, the Court erred in
determining withdrawal of life support is the more benign of the two procedures.
Instead, patients (or their surrogates) requesting that withdrawal of life support
require much more external participation than do patients merely asking for a
prescription they will self-administer. Because these former patients require
surrogates or a court to make the decision and physicians to withdraw life support
and often administer lethal drugs, there are several potential areas of abuse. Because
the patient maintains control at all stages of PAS, the potential for abuse is
substantially lower, and the Court's dichotomy fails to serve any legitimate ends.
Colin Miller

